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In philosophical methodology, intuitions are used as evidence to
support philosophical theories. In this paper, I evaluate the skepti-
cal argument that variation in intuitions is good evidence that our
intuitions are unreliable, and so we should be skeptical about our
theories. I argue that the skeptical argument is false. First, varia -
tion only shows that at least one disputant is wrong in the dispute,
but  each  disputant  lacks  reason  to  determine  who  is  wrong.
Second, even though variation in intuitions shows that at least one
disputant has the wrong intuition in the thought experiment, it is
not evidence of unreliability of any disputant’s intuition regarding
the philosophical theory being tested. So, variation in intuitions is
not good evidence that  one’s own intuitions are unreliable. One
reply from the literature in peer disagreement is that we should
conciliate if we cannot determine who is wrong. I argue that these
disagreements  are  instead  unconfirmed peer  disagreements
(i.e., no good reason to take or dismiss disputants as an epistemic
peer, inferior or superior). I argue that if you have a strong intu-
ition about a case, then it is rational for you to remain steadfast.
Thus, variation in intuitions does not call for skepticism.
Keywords: metaphilosophy, philosophical methodology, intuitions, ex-
perimental philosophy, epistemology of disagreement, peer disagree-
ment
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В философской методологии интуиции используются в качестве
средств обоснования философских теорий. В этой статье автор
анализирует скептический аргумент о том, что вариативность
интуиций указывает на их ненадежность. Это обстоятельство,
в свою  очередь,  ведет  к  скепсису  в  отношении  основанных
на них теорий. Однако автор полагает, что скептический аргу-
мент ложен. Во-первых, вариативность указывает только на то,
что,  по  крайней  мере,  один  спорщик  неправ,  однако  у  нас
недостаточных  оснований  для  того,  чтобы  определить,  кто
именно  неправ.  Во-вторых,  вариативность  интуиций  сама
по себе  не  говорит  о  ненадежности  интуиции  какого-либо
спорщика в отношении проверяемой философской теории. Та-
ким образом, вариативность интуиций вообще не означает, что
какая-то конкретная интуиция ненадежна. При этом в ряде ра-
бот отстаивается позиция о том, что спорщики должны прими-
риться, если не могут определить, кто именно неправ. Однако
автор отстаивает противоположную позицию. Он утверждает,
что эти разногласия, напротив, являются разногласиями  пред-
положительно равных (т. е., у нас нет веских оснований для
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признания спорщиков в качестве эпистемической ровни, равно
как и для признания превосходства одного из них). Автор пола-
гает, что при наличии уверенности в некоторой интуиции ра-
зумно следовать ей. Автор заключает, что тезис о вариативно-
сти интуиций не приводит к скептицизму.
Ключевые слова: метафилософия, философская методология, ин-
туиции,  экспериментальная философия,  эпистемология несогла-
сия, разногласия равных
Objection From Variation In Intuitions
In traditional philosophical methodology, intuitions are used as evid-
ence to support philosophical theories.1 Typically, these intuitions are eli-
cited through thought experiments designed to test necessity and/or suffi-
ciency  philosophical  theories. [Osborne,  2014,  p.  444] According  to
Edouard Machery and Alvin Goldman, authors of such thought experi-
ments describe a hypothetical situation and invite readers to make an in-
tuitive judgment about an aspect of the described scenario.2 For example,
they may ask, “Does a given predicate ‘F’ apply to an event,  an indi-
vidual, a pair of objects, etc. in the scenario?” [Goldman 2012, p. 280]
If the reader’s intuitive judgment supports the hypothesised philosophical
theory, then the reader has evidence that the hypothesised philosophical
theory is true. If the reader’s intuitive judgment does not support the hy-
pothesised philosophical theory, then the reader has evidence that the hy-
pothesised philosophical theory is false. To illustrate, consider the follow-
ing variant of the Gettier case used to test the philosophical theory that
“Subject S knows p iff subject S has a justified true belief that p”:
“Suppose, while in good conditions for visual perception, you look up at
the top of a hill and see what looks exactly like a zebra. Suppose further
that you are in a location where zebras are somewhat commonplace. You
then justifiably form the belief ‘There is a zebra on the hill.’ In reality,
the ‘zebra’ is  a cleverly painted mule; just  behind the mule,  outside of
your visual reach, is an actual zebra on the hill.” [Osborne, 2014, p. 444]
Philosophers  then  ask,  “Do  you  know  that  there  is  a  zebra  on
the hill?” Intuitively, it seems you do not. Here, Osborne offers a helpful
heuristic to understand how the refutation of the theory is carried out by
constructing the following argument:
1 For a  contrary view that  says philosophers  do not  use intuitions as  evidence,  see
[Williamson, 2007], [Deutsch, 2009, 2010], [Cappelen, 2012] and [Molyneux, 2014].
For defence of the claim that philosophers use intuitions as evidence, see [Pust, 2016],
[Chalmers,  2014,  pp.  535‒544],  [Devitt,  2015,  pp.  669‒699],  [Climenhaga,  2017,
pp. 69‒104].
2 See [Machery, 2011, p. 194] and [Goldman, 2012, p. 280].
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1. The subject has a justified true belief that there is a zebra on the hill.
(from the thought experiment)
2. The subject does not know that there is a zebra on the hill.  (from the
reader’s intuition)
3.  Therefore,  justified true belief  is  not  sufficient  for  knowledge. [Os-
borne, 2014, p. 444]
Osborne notes that the reader need not explicitly construct the argu-
ment above and accept each premise to be justified in inferring the false-
hood of the hypothesised philosophical theory that “Subject S knows p iff
subject S has a justified true belief that p”. [Osborne, 2014, p. 444] How-
ever, the argument makes two things explicit. First, it shows clearly that
the reader’s intuition is used as evidence to justify his rejection of the the-
ory. Next, it shows that the reader’s own intuition is evidence for him that
the theory is false. If the reader had the opposing intuition – that the sub-
ject knows that there is a zebra on the hill – then he would have evidence
to justify his belief that the theory is true. For this use of intuitions to be
justified, the following thesis must be true:
UOIE (Using-Own-Intuitions-as-Evidence): It is epistemically justified to
use one’s own intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories.
There is another way intuitions are used as evidence in philosophical
methodology: through using the intuitions of others. For example, wide-
spread agreement in intuitions regarding a particular case, say c, is evi-
dence for philosophical theories that agree with the verdict in c.3 Thus, if
most people have intuitions that agree with premise (2) of Osborne’s ar-
gument, we also have evidence that “Subject S knows p iff subject S has a
justified true belief that p” is false. Less commonly, though possible, one
may also use the intuitions of others as evidence for philosophical theo-
ries even if: (a) one lacks reason to think that there is widespread agree-
ment, and/or (b) one has reason to believe that there is widespread dis-
agreement,  and/or  (c)  one has  the  conflicting intuition,  and/or (d) one
lacks the intuition.
Here  is  the  problem.  Experimental  philosophers  working on  intu-
itions have raised findings that cast doubt on the evidential status of intu-
itions.  According  to  Jonathan  Weinberg,  philosophers  such  as  Robert
Cummins argue that “our best possible accounts of where intuitions can
come from do not square well with our hopes that they are any sort of re-
liable  guide  to  a  truth  beyond themselves”  [Weinberg,  2007,  p.  318],
while philosophers such as Stephen Stich and Jaakko Hintikka have ar-
gued that “intuitions can have no normative epistemic force, are ungroun-
ded in any theory of their correct use, are unreliable, and generally speak-
3 For example,  [Machery et  al.,  2011]  writes  that  the philosophers  working in  phi-
losophy of language try to construct theories of reference that are consistent with our
intuitions.
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ing ought to be abandoned with the likes of palmistry and entrail reading”
because intuitions have a lousy track record.4 [Stich, 1990] and [Hintikka,
1999] There are thus multiple challenges to using anyone’s intuitions as
evidence. 
In this paper, I evaluate the following skeptical argument (henceforth
Variation-in-Intuitions-Argument):
P1. There is variation in intuitions.
P2. Variation in intuitions is good evidence that our intuitions are unreli-
able.
P3. If our intuitions are unreliable, then we should be skeptical of our the-
ories. 
C. We should be skeptical of our theories.
By variation in intuitions, I mean that different people have different
intuitions regarding the same case. The conclusion of the Variation-in-In-
tuitions-Argument entails  that  UOIE  is  false.  Goldman  (2012)  offers
a possible  interpretation  of  the  Variation-in-Intuitions-Argument using
the reliable-indicator construal of evidence.
Reliable-indicator  Criterion:  X  is  evidence  for  Y if  and  only  if  X  is
a (fairly) reliable sign, or indicator, of (the truth or existence) of Y. [Gold-
man, 2012, p. 283]
On the reliable-indicator construal of evidence, intuitions are evidence
for philosophical theories if and only if intuitions are a (fairly) reliable sign,
or indicator, of the truth of those philosophical theories. Goldman thinks
experimental philosophers have provided defeasible higher-order evidence
(i.e., defeasible evidence about the evidential quality of intuitional evid-
ence) that intuitions are unreliable by showing that there is variation in in-
tuitions.  [Goldman,  2012,  p.  286] In other  words,  Goldman thinks that
variation in intuitions implies unreliability in everyone’s intuitions; includ-
ing our own intuitions. For example, Goldman notes a study on Gettier
cases by Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich that shows
that there is variation in intuitions. In their research, they found that 50% of
East Asians and only 26% of Westerners had the intuition that the subject
knows in the Gettier case. [Goldman, 2012, p. 286] Thus, we see both vari-
ations  in  intuitions  within  and  between  different  cultural  groups. One
might object that their studies cannot be replicated, or question the way
they conducted their experiment.5 If one does so, one has provided higher
order evidence that defeats the evidence presented by the findings of ex-
perimental philosophers. [Goldman, 2012, p. 288] I will, however, set these
4 See [Weinberg, 2007, p. 318], [Cummins, 1998], [Stich, 1990] and [Hintikka, 1999].
5 See for example [Seyedsayamdost, 2015].
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issues aside.  Assuming that there indeed is variation, should this call for
skepticism of our philosophical theories that are supported by our disputed
intuitions?
To see why Goldman thinks that variation implies unreliability, sup-
pose in the above variant of the Gettier case, 30% of readers judge that
they know that there is a zebra on the hill while 70% of readers judge that
they do not  know that  there  is  a zebra  on the hill.  Call  this  scenario
the Disputed-Gettier-Case. Since there is only one right answer – either
they know, or they do not know, at least 30% of the readers have judged
wrongly. If so, it would seem that the readers’ intuitions are not reliable
indicators of the truth of the philosophical theory “Subject S knows p iff
subject  S has a justified true belief that  p.” If our intuitions are not reli-
able indicators, then we have reason against using them as evidence for
the philosophical theory “Subject  S knows p iff subject  S has a justified
true belief that p.”
When generalised to any given thought experiment where the readers
have contrary judgments, say p and not-p, assuming that there is one right
answer, at least one group made the wrong judgment. [Goldman, 2012,
p. 288] Furthermore,  if  there  is  high variation in  thought experiments,
it is less likely that our intuitions get the right judgments (e.g., if there is
a 50/50 split,  we will only make the right judgment 50% of the time).
[Goldman, 2012, p. 288] Thus, variation in intuitions is evidence that our
intuitions  are  unreliable  in  such  disputes,  and  consequently  cannot  be
used  as  evidence  for  the  truth  of  such  disputes  (i.e.,  UOIE is  false).
So, we should be skeptical of philosophical theories relying on intuitions
that vary amongst readers.
To further  motivate  the  Variation-in-Intuitions-Argument,  consider
two recent instances of variation regarding our sense perception. The first
concerns the actual colour of a dress – whether the dress is blue and black
or white and gold. The second concerns whether a speaker is actually say-
ing “yanny” or “laurel”.6 In both cases, a large majority of subjects claim
that only one option can be right and seems right to them.7 Sense percep-
tion thus seems to be an unreliable indicator of the truth of those disputed
matters, for consider: Assuming that only one answer is correct, if 50%
believed that the speaker was only saying “laurel” while the other 50%
believed that the speaker was only saying “yanny”, then at least 50% are
wrong. If so, sense perception produces the wrong belief at least 50% of
the time in such cases; thus, it does not reliably track truth regarding the
6 See www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-31656935 and [Salam, 2018].
7 I do note that there have been recent scientific explanations behind the variation in
perceptual  judgments  and  it  has  come  to  light  that  there  is  no  particular  “right”
answer. However, suppose we were unaware of the scientific explanations. We seem
to have good reasons to believe that only one answer is right. Would we then have
good evidence to think that our senses were unreliable?
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yanny/laurel debate. Such cases hence seem to be evidence that the hu-
man sense faculty is unreliable regarding those disputed matters (i.e., we
have  reason  to  doubt  that  human  hearing  can  correctly  distinguish
between “yanny” and “laurel”). Given this, we should not trust anyone’s
senses in such disputes. 
One further clarification should be made: A single case of variation
in sense perception does not provide sufficient evidence that sense per-
ception is generally unreliable. We do not conclude that everyone’s sense
perception is unreliable in all perceptual matters because of the disagree-
ment  about  the  dress colour  and whether the  speaker said “yanny” or
“laurel”. Similarly, we should not conclude from a single case of vari-
ation in intuition (e.g.,  Disputed-Gettier-Case) that everyone’s intuitions
are generally unreliable in tracking the truth of all philosophical theories.
Minimally, we must show that there is a significantly large number of dis-
puted intuitions (for example, as evidenced by the burgeoning literature
in experimental philosophy) to plausibly claim that everyone’s intuitions
are unreliable in tracking the truth of all philosophical theories.
One may object at this point that even if experimental philosophers
can show that there are many cases where our intuition seems to be unre-
liable, we should not immediately conclude that intuition is generally un-
reliable in tracking the truth of all philosophical theories. This is because
we do not make such conclusions in other fields. Consider sense percep-
tion again. Although we can show that there are many cases where our
sense  perception  seem to  be  unreliable  indicators  of  perceptual  truths
(e.g., visual illusions where sense perception has a significant likelihood
of being wrong), we do not conclude that perception is generally unreli-
able in all perceptual  matters.  Similarly,  even if  there are  many cases
where  our  intuition  has  a  significant  likelihood  of  being  wrong,  we
should  not  conclude  that  intuition  is  generally  unreliable  in  tracking
the truth of all philosophical theories. 
However, the reason why we do not conclude that everyone’s percep-
tion is generally unreliable is that we have independent evidence to think
that the number of cases where our perception is accurate far outweighs
the number of cases of visual illusions. If our evidence showed us that the
number of visual illusions we have far outweighed the number of cases
where our perception is accurate, we should conclude that our perception
is generally unreliable regarding the truth of all perceptual matters. After
all, we would conclude that our perception is generally unreliable if we
found out that evil demons were constantly deceiving us about the ex-
ternal world and that all our perceptual beliefs were false. We cannot say
the same about intuitions – we do not have independent evidence to think
that the number of cases where our intuitions get it right outweighs the
cases where our intuitions get it wrong. Thus, the kinds of considerations
that make it rational to think that perception is reliable do not vindicate
UOIE.
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Reliability Of One’s Own Intuitions
In this section, I argue that evidence of variation in intuitions elicited
by thought experiment T, that is used to test philosophical theory P, is not
evidence of unreliability of  our own intuitions regarding P. For example,
variation in intuitions in Disputed-Gettier-Case is not evidence of unreliab-
ility of our own intuitions regarding the theory “Subject S knows p iff sub-
ject S has a justified true belief that p.” My first argument is that variation
in intuitions only shows that at least one disputant’s intuition (elicited by T
to test P) is wrong, but each disputant lacks reason to determine who is
wrong. So, variation in intuitions is not evidence that our own intuitions are
wrong. This is for three reasons. First, since there is only one right answer
in the dispute, parties that disagree cannot both be right. Second, we cannot
conclude from variation that both (or all of the) parties are wrong because
it is possible that one of the disputants got it right. Thus, variation only
shows that at least one disputant is wrong. Finally, variation in intuitions
cannot  show who is  wrong in  the  dispute  because  such  variation only
shows that at least someone is wrong; it does not say who is wrong. One
must have evidence independent of the dispute to identify who is wrong.
So, variation in intuitions is itself not evidence that our own intuitions are
wrong (or that the intuitions of one’s disputants are wrong). 
My second argument is that even though variation in intuitions (eli -
cited by T to test P) shows that at least one disputant has the wrong intu-
ition in T, it is not evidence of unreliability of any disputant’s intuitions
regarding P. This is because the concept of wrongness and one’s reliabil-
ity can come apart.  That is, it is possible for both parties to be reliable
and yet one of the disputants is wrong. Consider the following scenario:
Suppose Sammy is  99% reliable  regarding mental  calculations.  He is
a mental calculations expert. You give him a restaurant bill to calculate
and, in this instance, he makes the wrong calculation. Even though he
makes the wrong calculation, we do not conclude that the reliability of
Sammy’s mental calculation decreased when he was calculating this res-
taurant bill. Rather, the likelihood of him making the right calculation re-
garding  this  restaurant  bill  is  still  99%,  and  this  instance  is  part  of
the 1% likelihood that he gets it wrong. If this is not intuitive, suppose
instead of Sammy, we have a 99% reliable calculator. We use the calcu-
lator to calculate the bill, and in this instance, it makes the wrong calcu-
lation. Here, we do not conclude that the calculator is unreliable; it is
still 99% reliable. Instead, this instance is part of the 1% likelihood that
the calculator gets  the  calculation wrong.  Similarly,  showing that  one
disputant is wrong in this instance is not evidence that the disputant who
got it wrong is unreliable. Given my above two arguments, we can con-
clude that variation in intuitions is not evidence of unreliability of our
own intuitions. Thus, the challenge against UOIE fails.
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How about the previously mentioned perception cases (i.e., disagree-
ment about the colour of the dress and the yanny/laurel debate)? Those
cases seem to show us that variation in perceptual judgments should give
us reason to conclude that our sense perception is not reliable in such
cases. Before I offer my reply, it is important to note that both perception
cases  (e.g.,  the  yanny/laurel  debate)  and  cases  of  intuition  (e.g.,  Dis-
puted-Gettier-Case) seem to rely on the assumption that our intuitions
and perception are all (generally) equally likely to get us right belief. This
is because we knew that we had unequal levels of reliability regarding
perception and intuitions, we would expect variation in perceptual and in-
tuitive judgments. However, this is an assumption left undefended. 
Nonetheless, I will grant for now that we are all (generally) equally
likely to have the right intuition. Given that we are all (generally) equally
likely to have the right intuition, one might argue as follows: If disputants
are equally likely to make the right intuitive judgments about cases that in-
volve philosophical  theories,  then they are also equally likely to make
the wrong intuitive judgments about cases that involve philosophical theo-
ries.  If  these disputants are equally likely to  make the wrong intuitive
judgments about cases that involve philosophical theories, then they are
equally likely to make the wrong intuitive judgments in Disputed-Gettier-
Case. If so, showing that one of the disputants made a mistake in  Dis-
puted-Gettier-Case allows us to infer that the other disputant would have
been equally likely to make that same mistake in  Disputed-Gettier-Case.
So, it seems that even if the other disputant made the right judgment, it
would be by mere luck.  Thus,  both are unreliable in  Disputed-Gettier-
Case. Similarly, the perceptual disputes above seem to show that we are
individually  unreliable  in  those  matters  because  we  have  independent
reason to believe that we are already equally reliable regarding perception
(e.g., the biology behind how we see and hear is the same in most adults,
the person disagreeing with us seem to have no medical record of having
bad eyesight or hearing disabilities, etc.). Given that we have independent
reason to believe that we are equally reliable, we should think that we are
equally reliable in tracking truth in the disputed matter since it pertains to
perception. If we have reason to believe that we are equally likely to be
right and yet disagree, then even if we are right, we seem to only be acci-
dentally right, for we were equally likely as our disputant to have gotten
the wrong perceptual beliefs. If so, then it seems that we cannot track truth
reliably with regards to the disputed matter – thus, such disputes are proof
that we are unreliable in that disputed matter. 
However, I think this argument fails. As argued earlier, evidence that
one disputant has the wrong intuition in T is not evidence of unreliability of
that disputant’s intuitions regarding P. Even if more people joined the di-
spute,  evidence  that  one  disputant  is  wrong does  not  become evidence
of unreliability  of  everyone’s  intuitions  regarding  P. For  consider:  Sup-
pose Sammy joins Jim. Jim is also 99% reliable in mental calculations and
102
THE ARGUMENT FROM VARIATION...
likewise given the same restaurant bill. First, even though Sammy and Jim
are both equally likely to get the calculation right, they are both not guaran-
teed to get the calculation right (since there is a 1% chance Sammy gets it
wrong and a 1% chance that Jim gets it wrong). Thus, the fact that either
makes a mistake is compatible with the fact that they each have a 99% like-
lihood in making the right calculation regarding this restaurant bill. Now
suppose Sammy makes a mistake in his calculation while Jim does not.
As argued earlier, Sammy is still 99% reliable even though he makes a mis-
take. Jim’s reliability in calculating this restaurant bill does not increase to
100% either,  even  though he  does  not  make  a  mistake  calculating  this
restaurant bill.  Instead, both are still  equally likely (i.e., 99% chance) to
make the right calculation regarding the restaurant bill. Thus, Sammy’s mis-
take does not  make Jim unreliable even though they were both equally
likely (i.e., 1% chance) to make the same mistake. It also does not follow
that Jim made the right judgment by mere luck; Jim made the right judg-
ment based on his cognitive abilities. 
Goldman’s  conclusion  in  a  case  where  50%  of  the  subjects  have
the intuition that p while 50% have the intuition that not-p is that at least
50% are wrong, and thus intuitions are unreliable. One might think that we
can hence conclude that the subjects are 50% reliable. This, however, will
not do.‘50%’ expresses one’s likelihood of being the wrong one in the dis-
pute where we cannot independently evaluate who made a mistake. For
suppose yet again that unknown to us, it is Sammy who made a mistake.
Since Sammy and Jim have the same reliability of 99% regarding the bill,
they are equally likely to be the wrong one in the dispute. Thus, we judge
that there is a 50% chance that it is Sammy who made the wrong judgment
but Jim did not; and a 50% chance that it is Jim who made the wrong judg-
ment but Sammy did not. To emphasise, this does not mean that both their
reliability drops to 50%. They are still 99% reliable. 
Another analogy is this: Suppose a dice was thrown and covered be-
fore Sammy and Jim could see what it landed on. They are then asked to
guess the number on the dice. Sammy guesses that the dice landed on “1”,
while Jim guesses that the dice landed on “2”. Individually, the reliability
of their guess is 16.666%. Now suppose someone peeked at the dice num-
ber and told both Sammy and Jim that only one of them is right, but did
not  mention who.  Here,  it  seems that  the  chance that  Sammy is  right
is 50%, while the chance that Jim is right is 50%. However, this does not
make the reliability of their guess increase to 50%. Given this, we can
make a distinction between individual reliability and one’s likelihood of
being the right one in the dispute. Variation in intuitions thus does not
show individual unreliability even in disputants who are equally likely to
get the right beliefs.8 
8 One may object further that if two parties have divergent intuitions across a number of
thought  experiments,  then  we have  evidence  that  at  least  one of  the parties  have
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Using One’s Own Intuitions
In Cases Of Unconfirmed Epistemic Peerhood
Thus far, I have argued that variation in intuitions elicited by thought
experiment T (that is used to test philosophical theory P) is not evidence
of unreliability in  any  disputant’s intuitions regarding P. Instead, it only
shows that at least one disputant is wrong and that we cannot tell who.
Some may think this is still problematic for UOIE. This is because even
though variation in intuitions does not show unreliability, assuming that
we are equally likely to have the right intuition, we cannot tell who made
a mistake. If so, we should suspend judgment whether we have it right,
and consequently also suspend judgment about the content of our intu-
itions.  This  line  of  thought,  known  as  Conciliationism,  comes  from
the literature in peer disagreement. Conciliationism is the claim that gain-
ing evidence that you are a party to a peer disagreement calls for you to
make at least some doxastic conciliation. [Mattheson, 2017] Some philo-
sophers who endorse Conciliationism are [Bogardus,  2009],  [Feldman,
2006], [Kraft, 2012] and [Matheson, 2015].
Peer disagreements are disagreements in which all disagreeing par-
ties are epistemic peers. According to Jonathan Matheson, roughly, agents
S1 and S2 are epistemic peers regarding p if and only if they are in an
equally  good epistemic position  regarding p.  [Mattheson,  2017]  Here,
one’s epistemic positions regarding p is determined by one’s evidential
possession regarding p (i.e., how good his evidence regarding p is) and
evidential  processing regarding p (i.e.,  whether  he has  good cognitive
faculties and epistemic virtues). [Mattheson, 2017] One way to tell that
S1 and S2 are epistemic peers is if they are equally likely to be right
about p – even if S1 and S2 do not have equal evidential possession and
equal evidential processing regarding p. Matheson argues that this is be-
cause “[e]xcesses in one area can account for deficits in the other, result-
ing in no net loss or gain.” [Mattheson, 2017]
The claim that UOIE is problematic thus relies on two further claims:
(1) variations in intuitions are cases of peer disagreements, and (2) Con-
ciliationism is true. Regarding (2),  although initially compelling, other
philosophers  have  provided  strong  defences  of  the  opposite  view  –
the Steadfast  view.9 That  is,  gaining  evidence  that  you are  a  party  to
a peer disagreement does not call for you to make any doxastic concili-
ation.  [Mattheson,  2017]  My purpose  in  this  section,  however,  is  not
to argue whether Conciliationism is right or the Steadfast view is right.
unreliable intuitions.  However, even if this inference is granted, the disagreements
alone do not show who is unreliable (and also does not show that both parties are
unreliable).
9 For a strong defence of the Steadfast View, see [Kelly, 2005].
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Instead, I will argue that (1) is false – variations in intuitions are cases of
what Frederick Choo calls unconfirmed peer disagreements. [Choo, forth-
coming] In cases of unconfirmed peer disagreements, there is no good
reason for us to take or dismiss our disputants as an epistemic peer, in-
ferior or superior. We just do not know our epistemic positions relative to
our disputants.10 I then argue that whether one should remain steadfast
(i.e., one does not make any doxastic conciliation) or skeptical in cases of
unconfirmed peer disagreement depends on the strength of one’s own in-
tuitions. I do think that in most cases, philosophers use their stronger in-
tuitions to support their philosophical theories. If so, this would permit
steadfastness despite variation in intuitions. Thus, variation in intuitions
does not call for skepticism.
According to Choo, there are two methods to assess if someone is
your epistemic peer.11 The first is whether you have wide-ranging agree-
ment or disagreement with your disputant regarding other intuitions that
are related to the disputed intuition. For example, suppose you and an-
other agent have agreeing intuitions about the Trolley Cart thought ex-
periment – you both agree that the lever should not be pulled to divert
the cart to kill one person instead of five. Thus, you and that agent seem
to have intuitions that do not support the philosophical theory “An act is
morally justified if it maximises utility.” We may raise further thought
experiments that test that same philosophical theory.12 If you and that
agent  still  have  agreeing intuitions  in  many of  these  thought  experi-
ments, we have evidence that you and that agent are epistemic peers re-
garding the truth of that philosophical theory. However, if you and an-
other agent have disagreeing intuitions about the Trolley Cart thought
experiment and  further disagreeing intuitions in other thought experi-
ments which test the same philosophical theory, we have evidence that
you and that  agent are  not epistemic peers regarding the truth of that
philosophical theory.
There are two worries if we use the first method to assess whether
we  are  peers  regarding  making  the  right  intuitive  judgments  about
philosophical  theories.  First,  it  seems  that  wide-ranging  agreement
among the same disputants in intuitions regarding the truth of more spe-
cific positive philosophical theories (i.e., philosophical theories that are
not broad, general claims or negation claims) is rare. For example, there
10 For further discussion on unconfirmed peer disagreements, see [Choo, forthcoming]
11 See [Choo, forthcoming]. See also [Grundmann, 2013] and [Elga, 2007] for similar
views. Grundmann argues that there are four different ways to justify the peerness
assumption: (1) justification by default, (2) the track record method, (3) arguing from
widespread  background  agreement  and  (4)  arguing  from  general  philosophical
competence. He then argues that all four cannot be met.
12 For example, we may ask, “Is it morally permissible to kill one person if a terrorist
threatens to kill 20 other people unless you killed one person?”
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are many variations of philosophical theories in philosophical literature
to accommodate the different,  more specific intuitions that disputants
have. If so,  we lack evidence that we are peers in disputes regarding
the truth of specific positive philosophical theories. Even if we are peers
regarding broadly agreed upon philosophical theories, it is the disputes
that we are concerned with and if we can remain steadfast in those dis -
putes.  Second,  I  think that  wide-ranging disagreement  with your dis-
putant is not conclusive evidence that you are not epistemic peers. Here
is one way that  there can be wide-ranging disagreement in epistemic
peers. Recall Matheson’s argument that S1 and S2 can still be epistemic
peers even if S1 and S2 do not have equal evidential possession and
equal evidential processing, as long as they are in an equally good epi -
stemic position. If S1 and S2 do not have equal evidential possession
and  equal  evidential  processing  when  making  intuitive  judgments,
the differences in evidential possession and evidential processing may
cause differences in other related intuitive judgments. The wide-ranging
disagreement in intuitions may materialise in something like the follow-
ing scenario: You and your disputant have different evidential posses-
sion and different evidential processing but are individually equally un-
reliable (e.g., 50% reliable). Out of all the wide-ranging disputes, you
happen to be right  50% of  the time while  your  disputant  is  right  the
other 50% of the time because of the differences in evidential posses-
sion and evidential processing. Hence, both of you are 50% reliable. So,
wide-ranging disagreement  is  not evidence that  we are  not  epistemic
peers. If so, the first  method of assessing is inconclusive because  we
lack evidence that we are peers in disputes and we lack evidence that
we are not peers.
The second method of assessing whether someone is your epistemic
peer is based on the relevant credibility-conferring features (i.e., eviden-
tial possession and evidential processing). [Choo, forthcoming] Some ex-
amples of relevant credibility-conferring features regarding intuitions are:
possessing knowledge of the relevant philosophical distinctions, compet-
ence  in  the  language,  familiarity  with  the  philosophical  theory  being
tested, freedom from biases and having un-muddled intuitions (i.e., intu-
itions that are not misdirected or about notions other than the ones under
discussion).13 Here is the problem. There are disputes over what the rele-
vant philosophical distinctions are and which intuitions are un-muddled,
and there seems to be no independent way of verifying what they are.
When it comes to determining what the relevant distinctions are, philo-
sophers  often object  to  their  disputants  on the  grounds that  their  dis-
putants are not making good philosophical distinctions, while their dis-
putants  argue  that  these  distinctions  are  irrelevant.  Furthermore,  both
disputants maintain that they are right. For example, some philosophers
13 The term “muddled intuitions” is coined by [Schroer & Schroer, 2013].
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have argued that there is an intuitive do/allow distinction in the Trolley
Cart thought experiment which is relevant in determining the correct eth-
ical judgment, while their disputants argue that these distinctions are ir-
relevant to the truth of our ethical theories.14 When it comes to determin-
ing which intuitions are un-muddled, philosophers often object to their
disputants on the grounds that their disputants have muddled intuitions,
while their disputants simply deny this. Here is one example from Cote-
Bouchard: 
“Illness: After making several tests, Rita’s doctor has bad news. She has
a very serious illness and only has a 5% chance of survival. This particu-
lar illness is very sensitive to patients’ anxiety and stress levels.  Since
Rita is very anxious and stressed about dying, following the evidence and
believing the truth about her prognosis will lower her chances to almost 0.
On the other hand, believing (falsely and unjustifiably) that she will al-
most  certainly  survive  will  dramatically  increase  her  chances.”  [Cote-
Bouchard, 2017, p. 30]
Cote-Bouchard writes that this seems to be a case where intuitively,
there is  nothing good in conforming to epistemic norms. He also writes
that  disputants  argue  that  he  has  muddled intuitions  – his  intuition is
tracking an all things considered value instead of pro tanto value. [Cote-
Bouchard, 2017, p. 32] Cote-Bouchard  in turn replies that he  is  talking
about pro tanto value, while disputants maintain that his intuition is mud-
dled. [Cote-Bouchard, 2017, p. 33] In the above examples, there seems to
be no independent check to verify who is right. We only have evidence
that at least one is wrong. Thus, it seems that we cannot even begin to
compare based on credibility-conferring features. If so, we currently have
no good reason to take or dismiss our disputants as an epistemic peer, in-
ferior or superior. We just do not know our epistemic position relative to
our disputants.
Given that we seem to be in an unconfirmed peer disagreement re-
garding intuitions, what should we believe? Should we remain steadfast
or conciliate? I propose that whether a person should remain steadfast or
conciliate  depends on the strength of  one’s own intuitions.  If  one has
a strong intuition regarding p, then one should remain steadfast despite
having evidence there is unconfirmed peer disagreement. However, if one
has a weak intuition regarding p, then one should have some degree of
conciliation. Why accept my view? Here are two examples from the field
of mathematics and the field of perception that seem to endorse a similar
principle. 
Regarding mathematical  disagreements  where we have no independent
evidence about the epistemic status of  our disputant (i.e.,  unconfirmed
peer disagreement):
14 See for example [Kagan, 1989, pp. 83‒127].
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Case 1: Suppose you made the mental calculation “2+2=4”. A stranger
then asserts, “No, 2+2 is not equal 4!”
Case  2:  Suppose  you  made  the  mental  calculation  “230x27=6,210”.
A stranger then asserts, “No, 230x27 is not equal 6,210!”
Regarding perceptual disagreements where we have no independent evi-
dence about the epistemic status of our disputant (i.e., unconfirmed peer
disagreement):
Case 3: Suppose you see your computer in front of you. A stranger then
asserts, “No, there is no computer in front of you!”
Case 4: Suppose you see that in a far distance, there is a black horse graz-
ing under a tree. A stranger then asserts, “No, it is a dark brown horse
grazing under a tree!”
In both Case 1 and 3, it strongly seems to you that 2+2=4 and that
there is a computer in front of you. Here, it seems that there is no reason to
conciliate. In fact, David Christensen points out that if the conciliationist
accepts the skeptical principle that a person should conciliate as long as he
has no good evidence to privilege himself, then the conciliationist will be
lead to global skepticism if she meets a global skeptic. However, Chris-
tensen thinks it is clear that meeting a global skeptic should not call for
conciliation. [Christensen, 2011, p. 15‒16] This differs in both Case 2 and
4. In Case 2 and 4, it weakly seems to you that “230x27=6,210” and that
there is a black horse grazing under a tree. Here, it seems reasonable for us
to conciliate. Furthermore, meeting a global  skeptic would not call  for
global skepticism for we have beliefs that strongly seems to us to be true.
It would only call for skepticism in our weaker claims.
Similarly, if one has a strong intuition (say for example the intuition
that p and not-p cannot be true at the same time), then there seems to be
no reason to conciliate  in  unconfirmed peer  disagreements.  However,
if one has  a  weak intuition,  then it  seems reasonable  for  one to  con-
ciliate. Since in most cases philosophers use their stronger intuitions to
support their philosophical theories, this would permit steadfastness de-
spite variation in intuitions. Thus, variation in intuitions does not call for
skepticism.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that the skeptical argument that variation
in intuitions is good evidence that our intuitions are unreliable fails for two
reasons. First, variation only shows that one of the disputants is wrong, but
does not show who. Second, even though variation in intuitions in thought
experiment T shows that at least one disputant has the wrong intuition in T,
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it is not evidence of unreliability of any disputant’s intuitions regarding
the philosophical theory being tested. I have also considered a reply from
the philosophy of disagreement which calls for skepticism if the parties are
in a peer disagreement. I argue that variation in intuitions is not a case of
peer disagreement – instead, it is a case of unconfirmed peer disagreement.
Last, I argue for the principle that whether a person should remain steadfast
or conciliate depends on the strength of one’s own intuitions. If one has
a strong intuition regarding p,  then one should remain steadfast  despite
having  evidence  there  is  unconfirmed  peer  disagreement.  However,  if
one has a weak intuition regarding p, then one should have some degree of
conciliation.
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